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National and international digital standards are having a growing im-
pact on international trade law. The traditionally most evident dimension 
of the extensive activity of standard-setting bodies in relation to the func-
tioning of the Internet is related to openness and interoperability, which 
are to be considered as core values in the development of the Internet 
and the Digital Trade Agenda.  
Against this background, the need for cybersecurity prompts State 
control over the Internet and affects trade liberalization, triggering the 
exception of national security. National standards therefore become an 
instrument of protection of the national interest, whose broad interpre-
tation provides a powerful protectionist tool. 
If new trade agreements are to consider these issues more directly, it 
is necessary to deal with cybersecurity in the context of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), finding viable solutions through an evolutionary 
interpretation, in particular, of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT).  
For a smooth functioning of TBT, a shared development of interna-
tional standards is needed, based on a public-private partnership that 
should aim at overcoming competition of standards and fragmentation, 
which could negatively impact the very structure of the Internet. 
Following this line, cybersecurity could become a foundational ele-
ment of trust for digital trade.  Rather than serving as a means to advocate 
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for national interests, it could become not opposite but complimentary 
to openness.  
International standards could therefore provide a viable solution to 
foster the development of international digital trade in the existing frame-
work of the WTO, serving cybersecurity issues without disregarding the 
principle of technological neutrality and the logic of openness and in-
teroperability. 
To develop these assumptions, this article will first introduce the con-
cepts of interoperability and standardization, then moving to cybersecu-
rity and its impact on international trade law, with particular reference to 
the WTO system and finally focusing on the actual and potential role for 
international digital standardization, in its public-private partnership di-
mension.    
 
 
2.  Interoperability, digital standardization and their seminal role for ICT    
 
As clarified by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), technical standards are documents that establish engineering 
norms for products or processes.1 In general, international trade lawyers 
agree that regulatory barriers to trade would be minimized should regu-
latory harmonization (or at least regulatory cooperation) be improved,2 
also through the adoption of shared technical standards.  
Particularly in Information and Communications Technology (ICT), 
where normative and technical dimensions are interwoven or even 
merged, standards are increasingly seen as an alternative to the use of 
international law and treaties to deal with digital issues and in particular 
 
1 Indeed, a technical standard is a ‘document, established by consensus and approved 
by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum 
degree of order in a given context’ and ‘based on the consolidated results of science, 
technology and experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits’ 
(cf International Standards Organization, Guide on standardization and related activities-
general vocabulary (2004) <www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:guide:2:ed-8:v1:en>). 
2  See N Mishra, ‘International Trade, Internet Governance and the Shaping of the 
Digital Economy’ (2017) ARTNeT Working Paper Series no 168, 9 
<https://artnet.unescap.org/publications/working-papers/international-trade-internet-
governance-and-shaping-digital-economy>.  
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issues of cybersecurity.3 Common technical standards are a sort of postu-
late for ICT and indeed they function as economic infrastructure capable 
of reducing barriers to the dissemination of technological innovation. 
The result is to increase consumer welfare by ensuring technical interop-
erability among products made by different producers.4  
The relevant literature suggests that social and economic benefits of 
standardization may include, inter alia, (i) lower costs thanks to the sim-
plification of complex processes, (ii) lower learning costs for new pro-
ducers, (iii) increased possibility for producers to exploit economies of 
scale, (iv) lower transaction costs between transacting parties, (v) higher 
market information and confidence by signaling product quality, or the 
compatibility of products or components, (vi) lower compliance costs, 
(vii) increased competition among producers and therefore (viii) lower 
prices to consumers.5  
The underlying rationale is openness and interoperability, because 
the potential for revolutionary technologies to change the way we live and 
work depends largely on their ability to communicate with each other. 
Global and supranational markets are indeed increasingly defined by 
ICT interoperability standards. No wonder that the EU Commission has 
long ago identified a lack of interoperability as one of the most significant 
obstacles to the virtuous cycle of digitalization,6 so that effective interop-
erability between networks, devices, applications, data repositories and 
services has ever since become one of the fundamental pillars of the so-
called European Digital Agenda.7 From this perspective, the continuous 
growth of technologies requires a new paradigm, necessarily character-
ized by a growing level of openness and interoperability. Such needs have 
 
3 For a general assessment of the normative role of standardisation and the theoretical 
relationship with the sources of international law see Y Radi, La standardisation et le droit 
international. Contours d’une théorie dialectique de la formation du droit (Bruylant 2013).  
4 See M Finnemore, DB Hollis, ‘Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity’ 
(2016) 110 AJIL 425, 437.  
5 See JK Winn, ‘Governance of Global Mobile Money Networks: The Role of 
Technical Standards’ (2013) 8 Washington J L Technology & Arts 197, 216.  
6 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe’ COM(2010)245 final, 3. 
7 See also W Kerber, H Schweitzer, ‘Interoperability in the Digital Economy’ (2017) 
8 J Intellectual Property, Information Technology & Electronic Commerce L 39.  
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resulted in an increased attention paid to standardization, which features 
prominently in the legislative and political agenda of the EU and US.8  
Standard-setting processes such as those conducted under the auspi-
ces of the ISO or the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) are among 
the most effective solutions in order to achieve technical interoperabil-
ity.9 As is well known, international governmental organizations are gen-
erally established to better pursue goals and activities which are interna-
tional in nature, because their reach goes beyond national borders. To 
that effect, some of them may have full authority to establish binding 
rules. More often, they set rules which do not amount to binding obliga-
tions, being framed in terms of soft law susceptible of voluntary ac-
ceptance.  
In particular, technical standards are nonbinding rules of great effec-
tiveness because they bear a high level of spontaneous compliance.  In 
this perspective, it is particularly evident that a strict opposition between 
binding and non-binding norms proves evanescent if not misleading. As 
voluntary standards are perceived as the appropriate international prac-
tice to deal with particular issues, in cooperation with other States and 
relevant actors, it is indeed unusual for States and other stakeholders to 
decide not to abide by them.10  
This is precisely the essence of openness in international technical 
standards aimed at creating shared and open innovation, which is vital 
for the development of ICT.11 Against this background, it is necessary to 
 
8 Accordingly, ‘[t]his shift suggests the adoption of a broader definition of open 
innovation, focused not only on the sharing of technological breakthroughs, but also on 
the sharing of data and models within the industry, as well as with consumers, authorities 
and other interested third parties’ (see S Barazza, “‘Let Me Talk to You’: Open Standards 
and the Technologies of the Future’ (2018) 13 J Intellectual Property L & Practice 167). 
9 Indeed, the ‘governance of technical standard-setting processes and managing the 
‘interface’ between national laws and technical standards are fundamental tasks that must 
be accomplished in order for any global market to function at an operational level’ (cf 
Winn (n 5) 203).  
10 For a critical assessment of the role of soft law in the international legal order and 
for a useful distinction of the formal and the substantial dimension of the divide between 
hard and soft law see J d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest 
for New Legal Materials’ (2008) 19 Eur J Int L 1075. 
11 See AD Sofaer, D Clark, W Diffie, ‘Cyber Security and International Agreements’ 
(2010) Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring CyberAttacks: Informing Strategies and 
Developing Options for US Policy 179, 198. 
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evaluate how cybersecurity issues may affect these general assumptions 
on open standards. 
 
 
3.  Cybersecurity and its ambiguous status in the context of Digital Trade 
 
Interoperability and openness cannot be considered in isolation from 
cybersecurity. These issues are indeed two sides of the same coin. Global 
cybersecurity implicates a range of economic, privacy, and national secu-
rity issues. As a matter of principle, there are two main general categories 
of cybersecurity issues: on the one hand, there are actions aiming at dam-
aging a cyber system (‘cyberattacks’); on the other hand, there are actions 
aiming at exploiting the cyber infrastructure for unlawful purposes with-
out damaging that infrastructure (‘cyber exploitation’).12  
Given the millions of lines of code involved in modern programming, 
vulnerabilities are an inherent feature of cyberspace so that indeed there 
can be no such thing as ‘zero risk’ in cybersecurity.13 
Cyber insecurity stems from the fact that cyber systems, as seen with 
reference to openness and interoperability, have been designed to facili-
tate access and utilization rather than security. The fact that we live in a 
hyper-connected world, where plenty of smart devices and objects are 
connected implies that the question is to determine the level of risk which 
shall be accepted and, therefore, does not amount to a danger to ‘essen-
tial interests’.14 
International cooperation and the execution of international agree-
ments can certainly enhance cybersecurity. This is why the UN began 
discussing cybersecurity issues as early as 1998 when resolution 53/70 
was passed.15 Yet in 2015, National Security Strategy report by the 
Obama administration argued that cybersecurity requires observed inter-
national norms and a shared responsibility among States, while at the 
 
12 ibid 181. 
13 See Finnemore, Hollis (n 4) 432. 
14 See S Peng, ‘Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO National Security Exceptions’ 
(2015) 18 J Intl Economic L 449, 470. 
15 See UNGA res 53/70 ‘Developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security’ (4 December 1998) UN Doc 
A/RES/53/70. 
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same time declaring that ‘the United States has a special responsibility to 
lead a networked world’.16 
This reveals how in principle States tend to acknowledge the global 
nature of cybersecurity challenges while at the same time in practice they 
show a general tendency to regulate cybersecurity issues at the national 
level.  
The result is that there are no comprehensive frameworks of interna-
tional rules trying to harmonize national systems, with the only exception 
being the Budapest Convention, which attempts to harmonize national 
criminal laws concerning cybercrime.17  
This situation leads to a paradox. Cybersecurity is at the same time a 
postulate for realizing the Digital Trade Agenda and one of the most 
widespread barriers that States are inclined to build for protectionist pur-
poses.       
Consequently, it is necessary to examine cybersecurity in the context 
of international trade law, both from the general systemic perspective of 
WTO law and from the perspective of national interest exceptions. 
 
 
4.  Cybersecurity in the context of international trade 
 
The Internet and ICT are capable of offering more benefits to the 
development of global trade than any single policy has ever managed to 
achieve. In this vein, it cannot be denied that the digital economy cannot 
keep growing unless the Internet remains an open, stable, secure and 
trustworthy environment18. Within this perspective, national measures 
implemented in order to ensure cybersecurity should only be justified if 
they comply with exceptions expressly provided by international trade 
agreements.  
It must be outlined that until recently, there were virtually no inter-
national trade agreement dealing directly with cybersecurity issues (let 
 
16 See SS Malawer, ‘Chinese Economic Cyber Espionage: U.S. Litigation in the WTO 
and Other Diplomatic Remedies’ (2015) 16 Georgetown  J Intl Affairs 158, 159, with  the 
reference to the Executive office of the President of the United States, National Security 
Strategy (February 2015). 
17 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (adopted 23 November 2001, 
entered into force 1 July 2004) CETS no 185. 
18  For further references see Mishra (n 2) 18.  
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alone trying to regulate them). Although this essentially holds true even 
today, it should be observed that, in the last few years, States have begun 
to include in international trade agreements specific chapters containing 
binding rules aiming at preventing contracting States from interfering 
with digital data flows.19 In order to work properly and achieve their 
aims, these chapters often include also other specific legal requirements 
on cybersecurity20 (or other connected issues). It has been observed that 
the incorporation of Internet policy issues in international trade agree-
ments is basically an attempt to cope with an ever-increasing necessity for 
regulatory coordination and cooperation between States on areas that im-
pact international trade, while also having a deep impact on the process 
of Internet governance.21 For this reason the main framework of refer-
ence still is WTO.  
 
4.1. Cybersecurity in the framework of WTO: The role of TBT 
 
To tackle the risk of digital protectionism, cybersecurity issues should 
be framed in the context of the WTO system and, in particular, cyberse-
curity standards should be evaluated in the context of the TBT. In fact, 
as cybersecurity standards often qualify as data localization measures, 
they produce a number of effects on the liberalization of trade. There-
fore, one way to tackle problems arising from conflicting national stand-
ards and to foster interoperability may lie in the application of TBT rules.  
As it is well known, TBT in principle covers technical product regu-
lations which are not covered by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement (SPS).22 Technical regulations may be adopted in the pursu-
ance of objectives of public policy, generally indicated in recital 6 of the 
Preamble of the TBT.23 However, the agreement is based on the ambiv-
 
19 See, for example, the Electronic Commerce Chapter of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement. 
20  See for example art 14.16 of the TPP, setting out a provision on cybersecurity 
cooperation among member countries.  
21  See Mishra (n 2) 5.  
22 See generally T Epps, M Trebilcock, Reserach Handbook on the WTO and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (Edward Elgar 2013).  
23 The TBT Preamble states that ‘no country should be prevented from taking 
measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive 
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alence of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment pro-
cedures. On the one hand, standardization serves diverse positive goals, 
by capturing network externalities and reducing information asymme-
tries.24 On the other hand, technical regulations adopted at the national 
level may disguise the intention to protect national industry. Consistently, 
TBT includes the basic principle that standards and technical regulations 
are considered illegitimate only when they constitute an unnecessary re-
striction on trade.25  
Generally, the TBT has been considered as mainly related to trade in 
goods. Thus, the application of TBT rules to cybersecurity standards 
could raise the issue of qualification of digital trade and digital products 
for establishing the applicable trade law regime.26 However, recent prac-
tice shows an increasing reference to TBT rules when it comes to cyber-
security national measures. The TBT Committee has already discussed 
the matter in various meetings, in which several WTO Members have 
highlighted the risk that cybersecurity national standards may hinder in-
ternational trade in ICT products.  
The rise of specific trade concerns (STCs) in relation to China’s cy-
bersecurity measures confirms that WTO Members are already consid-
ering the TBT applicable to these kinds of standards.27 The rationale and 
the nature of cybersecurity standards and regulations, as previously high-
lighted, shed some light on the relevance of TBT rules in this particular 
 
practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of 
this Agreement’ (emphasis added).  
24 See M Koebele, ‘Preamble TBT’, in R Wolfrum, P-T Stoll, A Seibert-Fohr (eds), 
WTO – Technical Barriers and SPS Measures (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade 
Law) (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 173.  
25 See recital 5 of the Preamble of the TBT.  
26 For a discussion on the nature of digital products and the applicable trade rules 
see S Fleuter, ‘The Role of Digital Products Under the WTO: A New Framework for 
GATT and GATS Classification’ (2016) 17 Chicago J Intl L 153 ff; F Farrokhnia, C 
Richards, ‘E-Commerce Products Under the World Trade Organization Agreements: 
Goods, Services, Both or Neither? (2016) 50 J World Trade 793 ff. The stalemate of 
WTO negotiations on the issue of digital trade finds its origin in the competing 
approaches of the US and the EU. See generally S Wunsch-Vincent, The WTO, the 
Internet and Trade in Digital Products: EC-US Perspectives (OUP 2006) 51 ff.  
27 See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 14-15 
June 2017, Doc G/TBT/M/72 (25 September 2017) 2-4.   
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context and show the possibility of using international trade obligations 
in order to balance conflicting national interests.  
This is also due to the particular content of TBT obligations, which 
are worth recalling. In particular, under Article 2.1 of the agreement, 
Member States are required to accord to other countries, by means of 
technical regulation,28 a treatment no less favourable than like products 
produced domestically. Moreover, Member States are also obliged to en-
sure that technical regulations and standards are not more trade-restric-
tive than necessary to fulfil a pursued legitimate objective.29  
However, for our purposes, the most relevant rule of the TBT is the 
one concerning the preference for international standards over national 
ones. According to Article 2.4 in fact, when a technical regulation is re-
quired and relevant international standards are available, Members shall 
use them as the basis for their own internal regulation, unless these inter-
national standards prove to be ineffective in light of the objective pur-
sued, due to geographical and climatic factors or to ‘fundamental techno-
logical problems’. Upon request of other Members, the regulating State is 
also under the duty to state reasons for not applying the available inter-
national standards.30 International standards therefore become an essen-
tial basis for the internal regulation, meaning that they must be used ‘as 
the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enact-
ing the technical regulation’.31 
This provision is generally interpreted as the acknowledgement of a 
pivotal role of international standards in the WTO system. More pre-
cisely their primacy is at the core of the TBT, which seeks the harmoni-
zation of different domestic standards in order to improve the efficiency 
of production and to facilitate international trade.  
Besides substantial obligations on technical regulation, the TBT sets 
forth certain transparency obligations that may be at odds with the very 
 
28 On the definition of technical regulation see WTO Appellate Body, European 
Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and the Marketing of Seal Products, 
Doc WT/DS400-401/AB/R (22 May 2014) paras 5.16 ff.  
29 The necessity test incorporated in the TBT follows the same pattern of the one 
related to general exceptions under art XX GATT.  
30 TBT, art 2.5.  
31 Hence, it is not necessary for national regulator bodies to enact a regulation entirely 
identical to the relevant international standards. See WTO Appellate Body, European 
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, Doc WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 
2002) paras 240 ff.  
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nature of cybersecurity national measures. Under Article 2.9.2 and under 
Article 2.10.1, Member States are required to notify draft technical regu-
lations (or regulations already adopted for matters of urgency) when two 
conditions are present: first, when an international standard does not ex-
ist or the domestic regulation is in contrast with relevant international 
standards; secondly, when the national regulation may produce a signifi-
cant effect on the trade of other Member States.32  Moreover, Member 
States adopting national technical regulations must also publish a related 
notice at an ‘early appropriate stage’.  
 
4.2  Cybersecurity, national interest clause and WTO 
 
As mentioned, the possibility for States to foster cybersecurity 
through national measures cannot be seriously contested: just as everyone 
would expect States to defend their citizens against enemy aircraft rather 
than leaving such task to each individual, no one would expect that States 
should behave differently in the realm cyberspace.33 
It should be noted, however, that domestic regulations on Internet-
related issues – including cybersecurity – are often adopted and enforced 
by national legislators without taking into consideration the global nature 
of cyberspace. Two connected aspects which are often neglected are that 
cybersecurity issues also relate to international trade and, therefore, that 
national measures aiming to enhance cybersecurity are inherently rele-
vant for international trade law.34  
Within the WTO legal order, States have the possibility of not com-
plying with their international legal obligations, if necessary, to protect 
their ‘essential security interests’.35 Issues arise mainly because, under the 
WTO, such national security exceptions are so-called ‘self-judging’ 
 
32 See L Tamiotti, ‘Article 2 TBT’, in R Wolfrum, P-T Stoll, A Seibert-Fohr (eds), 
WTO – Technical Barriers and SPS Measures (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade 
Law) (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 230.  
33 See P Rosenzweig, ‘The Organization of the United States Government and Private 
Sector for Achieving Cyber Deterrence’ (2010) Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring 
Cyber Attacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy. 
34  For further references see N Mishra (n 2) 18.  
35 See for example art XXI of the GATT, art XIV bis of the GATS, art 73 of the 
TRIPS, and art XXIII of the GPA.  
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clauses, meaning that the decision on what represents an essential secu-
rity interest as well as the decision on which measures are necessary to 
cope and protect such essential security interest are basically left to the 
WTO Member State that invokes the applicability of the clause.36 It 
comes as no surprise that these exceptions can be easily used by WTO 
Member States as a pretext for protectionist purposes.  
The national interest exceptions have not prevented the capacity of 
the WTO regime to operate effectively. This is probably due to the fact 
that WTO Member States appear to have exercised those rights with cau-
tion and restraint, perhaps knowing that such clauses are equally availa-
ble to all parties so that an extensive interpretation is in the interest of 
none of them. An indirect consequence of such restraint is that the prac-
tice (rectius, the lack thereof) under both the GATT and the WTO does 
not resolve the issue as to whether (let alone to what extent) a national 
security exception could be reviewable by a panel.37  
This is relevant because it has been observed that potential tensions 
with the national interests exception are especially – although not solely38 
– likely to arise in connection with the creation of cyber norms and stand-
ards.39 In the last few years, for example, several States have indeed 
adopted national measures restricting cross-border data flows and in-
cluding measures aimed also at improving the enforcement of domestic 
cybersecurity regulations or standards. Given the purposes for which cy-
bersecurity standards are adopted at the national level, transparency ob-
ligations might not be complied with in order to safeguard underlying 
national security interests, nor would their content be published in its 
entirety. 
 
36 See P Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(2nd edn, CUP 2008) 664. 
37 For further reference see Peng (n 14) 459-462. 
38 For example, also the recent decisions to impose tariffs and taxes on steel and 
aluminium imports within the US taken by the Trump administration has been argued to 
fall under art XXI of the WTO Agreement. 
39 It has been observed that ‘sharing information is a fundamental characteristic and 
benefit of transnational regimes and would be an important aspect of any cyber-security 
agreement. A government may occasionally be faced, however, with a situation in which 
sharing information related to a cyber threat could prejudice its security by, for example, 
revealing vulnerabilities or defensive plans to a State or non-state actor suspected of 
supporting cyberattacks. States should be permitted, in their discretion, to invoke a 
national security exception in all such situations’ (cf Sofaer, Clark, Diffie (n 11) 195. 
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A clear example is Chinese data security law, entered into force in 
2017.  It is considered one of the most complex and far-reaching of na-
tional cybersecurity legislations.40 As it relates to transparency in partic-
ular, the establishment of broad discretionary powers for the authorities 
in charge of the ‘security review’ of foreign ICT operators raises serious 
doubts of compatibility with WTO rules. Consequently, various Mem-
bers have requested that China clarify the scope of such review assess-
ments and the functioning of the connected procedures.41  
A further example, not pursued before the WTO, relates to Canada 
and a bidding process run in 2012 to consolidate the governmental many 
non-interoperable email platforms into a single system. Canada, a signa-
tory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), in-
troduced several measures that could be seen as discriminatory, including 
limiting bids to Canadian firms or Canadian subsidiaries, and requiring 
that support personnel must be Canadian citizens. Canada recognized 
that such requirements did not comply with the GPA but insisted that 
the national priority was sought in order ‘to create a secure, centralized 
communications infrastructure,’ and thus it invoked the national security 
exception provided by such trade agreements.42  
As already recalled, no WTO cases have ever involved a security ex-
ception.43 This situation may change considering that, earlier this year,44 
the United States informed the WTO that China’s data network re-
strictions that entered into force in March 2018 appear to create illegal 
restrictions for cross-border service supplies and needs to be addressed 
by the WTO.45 The Chinese government has replied that the challenged 
 
40 See T Schmitt, ‘China’s Great Firewall Remains Shut to Noncompliant U.S. Tech 
Firms’ (15 January 2018) Georgetown J Intl L Online <www.gjil.org/2018/01/chinas-
great-firewall-remains-shut-to.html>. 
41 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 14-15 June 
2017 (n 26) 2.  
42 See AA Friedman, ‘Cybersecurity and Trade: National Policies, Global and Local 
Consequences’ (2013) Center for Technology and Innovation at Brookings 5 
<www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCybersecurityNEW.pdf>.   
43 See Malawer (n 15) 161. 
44 Communication from the United States to the WTO of 23 February 2018 available 
on the WTO’s website. 
45 More specifically, the US statement ‘claimed that new Chinese regulations would 
prohibit Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and leased lines from connecting across the 
Chinese border’ (cf T Schmitt, ‘United States Flags China’s VPN Ban as Possible WTO 
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national measure does comply with WTO rules because it protects the 
general interest of the Chinese public, ensuring that foreign companies 
do not do any harm to Chinese national security and national consumers’ 
interests.  
Potential clashes between national legislation and international com-
mitments of the enacting States have been recently highlighted and dis-
cussed at the WTO level also with regard to the draft of the cybersecurity 
law proposed by Vietnam in 2017.46 Several WTO Member States indeed 
expressed concern that such measure could have an adverse effect on 
trade. 
In this vein it has been noted that national interest clauses should be 
interpreted in good faith.47 The principle of good faith qualifies as a gen-
eral principle of international law pursuant to Article 38(1)(c) of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice.48 Good faith interpretation is 
described as a two-stage process, composed of both an objective and a 
subjective level of scrutiny.49  In particular, applying the general principle 
of good faith to a self-judging clause such as the national interest clause 
would require ascertaining whether the State is genuinely convinced that 
the national measure not compliant with the international obligations of 
the State is adequate and necessary to protect an essential security inter-
est.50  
Overcoming the self judgement is therefore a complex task and it 
would imply an awkward test on subjective good faith, which is a very 
 
Violation’ (2018) Georgetown Law Technology Rev <www.georgetownlawtechreview.org/ 
united-states-flags-chinas-vpn-ban-as-possible-wto-violation/GLTR-03-2018/>).  
46 For example, art 34 of the draft law specifies that ‘[f]oreign firms providing 
telecommunication and Internet services in Vietnam shall comply with Vietnamese 
regulations, respect national sovereignty, interests and security, user interests, obtain 
licenses, locate their representative offices and servers in Vietnam, and secure user data 
and accounts’, while however according to WTO rules, foreign telecommunication and 
Internet service providers cannot be required to locate their representative offices in a 
given country. 
47 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 31 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art 26. 
48 See. AD Mitchell, M Sornarajah, T Voon, Good Faith and International Economic 
Law (OUP 2015).  
49 See M Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO (Hart 2007) 203. 
50 See Peng (n 14) 466.  
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difficult element to demonstrate.51 This prompts for a more thorough 
consideration of the role of international digital standards for dealing 
with cybersecurity issues in the context of WTO.  
 
 
5.   The role of international cybersecurity standards 
 
As it has been highlighted, cybersecurity plays a paradoxical role in 
international trade. On the one hand, domestic measures adopted in or-
der to ensure cybersecurity at the national level may have the effect – if 
not the object – to hamper international trade. At the same time, how-
ever, international trade would be hampered just as much by a lack of 
confidence in Internet security, as a high degree of Internet security is a 
prerequisite to facilitate digital economic transactions.     
A possible effective solution is offered by the adoption of interna-
tional technical standards, which may contribute to increasing the degree 
of confidence in Internet security. It is therefore not surprising that, 
within the last decade, standard-setting bodies have engaged in extensive 
activity in relation to the functioning of the Internet.  
The harmonization of cybersecurity standards, fostered by TBT obli-
gations, may also support an open Internet and reduce costs of Internet 
access, especially in developing countries. Several international standard 
setting bodies, such as ICANN and ETSI, have already addressed various 
issues of cybersecurity regulations.52 Nonetheless, for the TBT obliga-
tions to become applicable, international standardizing bodies must 
 
51 Indeed, the interpretive use of good faith in its subjective dimension proves 
difficult to apply effectively. As far as the existence of an essential security interest to 
protect from potential cybersecurity breaches is concerned, it is irrelevant whether, 
objectively speaking, the ICT system or the ICT infrastructure that the national measure 
aims at protecting are actually indispensable for security. What is relevant is whether the 
WTO Member State claiming the application of the national interest clause genuinely 
considers the enacted restriction to be adequate and necessary for the purposes of 
protecting an ICT system or an ICT infrastructure whose protection such State genuinely 
considers to be indispensable for security. This subjective level of scrutiny proves 
insufficient to tackle the risk of a purely unilateral use of the exception. On the 
weaknesses of a merely subjective use of the general principle of good faith in treaty 
interpretation see A Oddenino, Buona fede e Pacta sunt servanda nell’applicazione dei 
trattati internazionali (Giappichelli 2003) 97 ff. 
52 See recently the ETSI position paper on draft EU Regulation 2017/0225, available 
at <www.etsi.org/images/files/ETSI_position_paper-CyberAct_20180206.pdf>.  
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guarantee a certain level of participation by WTO Member States. In the 
US – Tuna Labelling (II) case, for instance, the Appellate Body recog-
nized that the Agreement on International Dolphin Conservation Pro-
gram (AIDCP), which would have permitted an alternative labelling on 
the part of the US, could not be considered as an international standard-
izing body, since WTO Members can only accede by way of invitation.53 
The same reasoning can be applied to other bodies currently dealing with 
digital standards, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD).54  
In the context of digital trade and cybersecurity measures, however, 
this mechanism may become particularly complex because of the way 
standards are created and developed, often by a joint cooperation be-
tween public and private bodies, in a context of great fragmentation.55  
In this vein, it should be underscored that private entities play major 
roles in the cybersecurity arena: technical standards are indeed developed 
and proposed mostly by non-governmental bodies,56 with the aim of en-
hancing cybersecurity.57 Examples include, among others, norms for Inter-
net service providers, hardware manufacturers, and software developers.58 
 
53 See WTO Appellate Body Decision, US – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Doc WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012) 
para 374. 
54 See JP Meltzer, ‘A New Digital Trade Agenda, E15Initiative’ International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum (Geneva, 
2015) 11 <http://e15initiative.org/publications/a-new-digital-trade-agenda/>.  
55 See W Liu, ‘International Standards in Flux: A Balkanized ICT Standard-setting 
Paradigm and its Implications for the WTO’ (2014) 17 J Intl Economic L 561, 568. 
56 Indeed, ‘[m]ultistakeholder processes like NETmundial (which involved NGOs, 
firms, and individuals) or the Montevideo Statement (which was signed by the major 
Internet institutions) suggest that the political basis of propriety can also arise among 
actors other than states’ (cf Finnemore, Hollis (n 4) 442).  
57 See Sofaer, Clark, Diffie (n 11) 182-183. 
58 On the extremely complex framework of reference for standard-setting and 
cybersecurity see Winn (n 5) 217-218, explaining that ‘[f]ormal public international 
standard-setting organizations that may have jurisdiction over ICT technical standards 
include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU); each of these organizations has a formal, public counterpart in each country that 
chooses to participate in them. While the processes used by these global technical 
standard-setting organizations seek to be transparent and inclusive, they may also be slow, 
bureaucratic, and out of touch with conditions in the markets in which the standards are 
to be implemented (…).  In order to ensure that ICT standard development can keep 
pace with rapid technological innovation in global ICT markets, new forms of private 
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In light of the above, the digital world largely operates without any 
formal international institution having the competence to set standards 
or practices. The digital world is indeed based on standards, but the term 
is often used to indicate something quite different from a rule adopted 
by an international governmental organization. Significant aspects of the 
inadequate level of security in cyber operations may stem from the limits 
to what can be achieved using informal organizations with no power to 
adopt even ‘soft law’ rules.  
To be sure, cyberspace provides a particularly clear example of how 
the effectiveness of a given rule does not necessarily depend solely on the 
public or private nature of the actor that adopts it. Market power can 
sometimes replace legal authority, and this is especially so in the digital 
sectors. If a technical standard is adopted by an association of undertak-
ings with enough market power, national regulators may find themselves 
bound to decide between two alternatives. The first is permitting their 
citizens to access the services offered according to the adopted standards; 
the second is exercising regulatory authority bearing the risk of prevent-
ing their citizens from being able to enjoy the service at stake should the 
market operators decide that it is not worth it to comply with the domes-
tic technical standards adopted in that specific jurisdiction (for example 
because of the size of the national market). In other words, once a plat-
form based on global ICT networks takes root within a domestic econ-
omy, regulators may find it difficult to mandate changes in the way the 
platform operates.59  
The depicted situation is consistent with Internet Governance ambi-
guities and with the unclear status of it, and of cybersecurity principles, 
 
international standard-developing organizations known as “consortia” or “fora” have 
emerged in recent years. These new ICT SDOs range in size from a small handful of 
members working closely together to thousands of members scattered around the world 
collaborating by means of Internet communications. The Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), developer of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) standard which defines the Internet, and the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) are examples of large, informal ICT standard-developing organizations with 
members around the world. By contrast, EMVCo, the ICT SDO for the European EMV 
payments standard, has only four members: American Express, JCB, MasterCard, and 
Visa. Informal private ICT SDOs are often referred to as consortia, and because they are 
generally exempt from regulation by national governments, they can often develop 
standards more quickly and efficiently than formal, public ICT SDOs’.   
59 See Winn (n 5) 226.   
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in the context of public international law.60 It has been suggested that the 
adoption of resolutions and recommendations by intergovernmental or-
ganizations on issues related to internet governance such as cybersecu-
rity, marks a ‘policy shift’ towards a ‘soft law approach’;61 such shift is 
addressed to the internet multistakeholder community as a whole consti-
tuting of States, businesses, and the civil society. Therefore, the develop-
ment of protocols or standards on cybersecurity, and management of se-
curity risks requires collaboration amongst different stakeholders and 
particularly of the private sector.  
While it has been observed that a system based on the actions of pri-
vate actors could prove to be more adequate than traditional mechanisms 
based on the adoption of standards by public international regulators, it 
has also been argued that  
 
‘[t]he current, de facto distribution of power appears to have ignited a 
competition for influence likely to disrupt rather than to enhance cyber 
security. An agreed redistribution of responsibilities that is acceptable 
to all stakeholders could ensure constructive cooperation in a highly 
complex undertaking’.62  
 
This shows the difficulty of striking a fair balance between the public 
and the private elements of the complex process of digital standard set-
ting. As recently underscored in reference to the role of standard setting 
in WTO system more broadly, the core issue is then determining the 
 
60 There is a growing literature on the ambiguous status of Internet Governance in 
International Law. See in general K Kittichaisaree, Public International Law of Cyberspace 
(Springer 2017). In Italian doctrine see, also for further reference, A Oddenino, La 
governance di internet fra autoregolazione, sovranità statale e diritto internazionale 
(Giappichelli 2008); G Ruotolo, Internet-ional law. Profili di diritto internazionale 
pubblico della rete (Cacucci 2012); and more recently G Della Morte, Big data e protezione 
internazionale dei diritti umani. Regole e conflitti (Editoriale Scientifica 2018) particularly 
pt I, ch 2.  
61 See Mishra (n 2) 16.  
62 See Sofaer, Clark, Diffie (n 11) 190, noting that although ‘current, privately and 
professionally controlled process for reaching common technology positions on cyber 
activities is valuable and worth preserving, a mechanism whereby national governments 
could concur in such positions through an international structure could serve to achieve 
faster and more uniform acceptance, resulting in more secure and robust cyber networks’, 
also because ‘an international arrangement could serve to resolve some if not all the 
current political manoeuvring over what agencies, states, or other entities should perform 
key transnational roles in ICT development and security’.  
48 QIL 51 (2018) 31-51          ZOOM IN 
 
traits that standardization bodies should have to the effect of being rec-
ognized under TBT.63 
As we have seen, digital standards are by  their very nature developed 
in a balkanized context, with a strong influence by private subjects. This 
feature of digital standardization, with particular reference to cybersecu-
rity, may raise some particular difficulties in ascertaining or acknowledg-
ing them for the purpose of TBT. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Information and communication technologies are today woven into 
every facet of human activity, from operating nuclear arsenals to raising 
cows.64 The postulate for a smooth functioning of ICT are the principles 
of interoperability and openness. 
At the same time, however, there can be no smooth functioning of 
ICT without cybersecurity. Society as a whole is increasingly dependent 
on cyber systems across the full range of human activities, including com-
merce, finance, health care, energy, entertainment, communications, and 
national defense.65 It seems therefore reasonable to hold that the need to 
ensure cybersecurity at the national level may be qualified as a matter of 
national policy pursuant to the protection of a national interest: cyberse-
curity’s breaches may indeed hamper not only economic interests but 
also public health and plenty of activities connected to national security. 
Such a unilateral approach to cybersecurity, though legitimate at least 
to a certain extent, may not only hamper trade in digital goods and ser-
vices but also negatively impact interoperability and its role as a postulate 
of an interconnected world. 
States usually declare that unilateral decisions are taken in order to 
protect national security. Quite often, however, such measures also have 
 
63 See P Delimatsis ‘Global Standard-Setting 2.0: How the WTO Spotlights ISO and 
Impacts the Transnational Standard-Setting Process’ (2018) 28 Duke J Comparative Intl 
L 273, 282. 
64 See Finnemore, Hollis (n 4) 426. 
65 See Sofaer, Clark, Diffie (n 11) 179. 
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the effect of boosting the domestic digital sector and, in a broader per-
spective, they may also have negative effects on international trade in dif-
ferent sectors.66 
Traditional dissatisfaction for the lack of international rules aimed at 
and capable of striking a balance between the potentially clashing inter-
ests of global trade, on the one hand,  and national rules aiming at ensur-
ing cybersecurity, on the other hand, mainly arose because the WTO 
agreements (including GATS and TRIPS) are largely considered inade-
quate to deal with the manifold and complex issues arising from the mod-
ern-day digital economy, if only due to the fact that they were adopted 
more than twenty years ago.67 It is also certainly true that the WTO, being 
a trade institution, is not the best placed body to deal with several aspects 
of digital trade, such as setting standards on cybersecurity or data pro-
tection.68 This inevitably leads to some difficulties in dealing with cyber-
security issues, and to a revived temptation of unilateralism.69  
As it is hard to imagine that States will soon find a sufficiently shared  
understanding on these issues, an international agreement on cybersecu-
rity is still far from being a concrete prospect. Therefore, a possible re-
sponse to a unilateral approach to cybersecurity seems to rely on the in-
teraction between international standardization and the existing WTO 
legal framework, which could try to reaffirm its centrality with particular 
reference to digital trade issues. In particular the practice within the TBT 
 
66  For further references see Mishra (n 2) 5.  
67  With specific regard to the TRIPS Agreement, it has been noted that ‘any effective 
international legal remedy to commercial cyber espionage needs to creatively interpret 
and apply the terms of TRIPS’ (see Malawer (n 15) 158).  
68 The same applies to other relevant aspects such as the determination of the 
legitimacy of online censorship. On this point see AD Mitchell, N Mishra, ‘Data at the 
Docks: Modernizing International Trade Law for the Digital Economy’ (2018) 20 
Vanderbilt J Entertainment & Technology L 1073, 1122. 
69 The complexity of balancing unilateral approach and the use of international 
standards in the context of cybersecurity measures are demonstrated by the current 
debate in the TBT Committee on China’s recently enacted cybersecurity law, that has 
been mentioned above. No wonder that various countries, including in the EU, are raising 
a number of concerns about China’s disregard for international standards, also recalling 
the risk of a lack of interoperability produced by incompatibilities between national and 
international standards. See Statement of the European Union to the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Doc G/TBT/W/509 (19 April 2018). Similar concerns have 
also been raised by Japan in relation to Vietnam’s draft cybersecurity law. See Committee 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 8-9 November 2017, Doc 
G/TBT/M/73 (6 March 2018) 2.  
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Committee shows that WTO law could still be the proper framework in 
which States may seek harmonization of technical standards related to 
cybersecurity issues.70  
This could be a viable solution provided that three conditions are met.  
First, this will be possible on the assumption that international stand-
ardization in this domain follows some basic principles consolidated in 
TBT Committee practice since the year 2000, namely transparency, open-
ness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, and respect 
of the development dimension.   
The development of international trade law also in relation to digital 
technical regulation could then follow the evolutionary approach taken by 
the DSB in the case of applicability of the GATS to e-commerce services.71 
 Second, a shift should take place in the interpretation of the role of 
standardization in the digital market. More precisely a truly international 
perspective on cybersecurity standards requires the understanding that 
cybersecurity is depending less on aspects such as where a given product 
is produced or by who such product is manufactured, than on the differ-
ent issue of how such product is actually made. This clearly entails a far 
greater importance for technical standards, which may not only ensure 
technical compatibility about devices produced and operated around the 
world but also become a viable alternative to most restrictive measures 
which could potentially be adopted to prevent their trade in order to 
safeguard cybersecurity.72  
Third, the principle of technological neutrality should be applied in 
its full dimension as an interpretive tool for the whole system. 
 
70 It is probably early to evaluate the full suitability of TBT law in addressing 
harmonization of cybersecurity technical regulations. Much will depend on whether 
Member States will be able to find a compromise between the inherent national 
dimension of cybersecurity measures and the need for a continuous development of 
common digital standards guaranteeing interoperability and openness of networks, and a 
fair balance of the interests involved, that also comprise the protection of trade secrets 
and IPR. The development of international trade law also in relation to digital technical 
regulation could then follow the evolutionary approach taken by the DSB in the case of 
applicability of the GATS to e-commerce services.   
71 See S Peng, ‘Regulating New Services through Litigation? Electronic Commerce 
as a Case Study on the Evaluation of “Judicial Activism” in the WTO’ (2014) 48 J World 
Trade 1189.  
72 See Peng, ‘Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO’ (n 14) 475. 
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Generally, technological neutrality is a principle of good regulation 
in Internet, telecommunications and data protection regulation originally 
established in the context of the International Telecommunication Un-
ion. The principle can have various and distinct meanings.73 The most 
common understanding of it is that the same regulatory principles should 
apply regardless of the technology used and therefore regulations should 
not be drafted in technological silos. Consequently, regulators should 
adopt, as far as possible, a technologically neutral position. So far, this 
has been the most common meaning and the one that has been suggested 
for incorporation in the law of WTO.74 
Going a step further, the principle can be read as meaning that regu-
lators should refrain from using regulations as a means to push the mar-
ket toward a particular structure that the regulators consider optimal. In 
a highly dynamic market, regulators should not try to pick technological 
winners. In particular, this meaning of the principle of technological neu-
trality may have a remarkable expanding power and could become the 
interpretive light for the activity of incorporating digital standards, par-
ticularly in the field of cybersecurity, in the framework of WTO law: a 
useful interpretive tool for the selection and application of standards, 
which could play a pivotal role  in balancing the various interests, both 
of public and private nature, which are involved in the fragmented and 
complex process of digital standard setting and regulation.75  
In conclusion, the battle for smoothly incorporating cybersecurity is-
sues into international trade law is not easy, but it can be won through a 
truly international standardization capable of keeping cybersecurity 
needs and openness and interoperability requirements together, under 
the same umbrella of technological neutrality. 
 
73 See W Maxwell, M Bourreau ‘Technology Neutrality in Internet, Telecoms and 
Data Protection Regulation’ [2015] Computer and Telecommunications L Rev 21 
74 See SY Peng, ‘Renegotiate the WTO Schedules of Commitments: Technological 
Development and Treaty Interpretation’ (2012) 45 Cornell Intl L J 403, 427. 
75 Indeed, ‘[c]yberspace already has a robust and diverse array of norms. National 
regulations, international laws, professional standards, political agreements, and technical 
protocols litter the cybersecurity terrain, all involving substantial normative commitments 
in various stages of development and diffusion’ (Finnemore, Hollis (n 4) 427). 
